China’s PV module and cell exports in August 2026: Module exports stabilize while cumulative YoY decline widens

According to customs data compiled by InfoLink, China exported approximately 15.26 GW of modules in August, close to 15.23 GW in July, up only 0.2% MoM but down significantly by 50% YoY from 30.82 GW. From January to August this year, China exported around 158.71 GW of modules, down 12% YoY from 179.42 GW, with the cumulative YoY widening markedly from around 3% in January–July. It should be noted that August 2025 recorded the highest monthly export volume of the year, with India alone importing 2.68 GW amid a shipping rush ahead of the implementation of the Approved List of Models and Manufacturers (ALMM) List-II. In August 2026, India’s imports fell to just 0.07 GW, accounting for around 17% of the YoY decline in China’s export volume that month. Therefore, the sharp widening of the YoY decline in August primarily reflects a high base effect rather than a renewed weakening in demand.

As for cells, China exported 7.84 GW in August, up 54% MoM, ending three consecutive months of declines, but still down 44%  from 13.96 GW. From January to August this year, China exported 72.69 GW of cells, up 9% YoY, with the cumulative YoY increase narrowing sharply from around 23% in January–July.

The largest importers of Chinese modules in August were the Netherlands, Pakistan, Brazil, Italy, and Saudi Arabia, in descending order. The five countries together imported 5.65 GW, accounting for 37% of China’s export volume. Europe remained the largest regional market for Chinese modules, importing 6.51 GW in August, accounting for 43% of the total. The Asia-Pacific region came in second, importing 4.02 GW, followed by the Americas (2.19 GW), the Middle East (1.63 GW), and Africa (0.91 GW). 

While the total module export volume was little changed, there was a significant shift in regional distribution. The Americas saw a monthly increase of approximately 30%, Asia-Pacific about 10%, and the Middle East about 3%, whereas Europe and Africa experienced monthly declines of roughly 5% and 38%, respectively. In GW terms, the combined monthly increase of approximately 0.89 GW in the Americas and Asia-Pacific was offset by the respective declines of 0.55 GW in Africa and 0.36 GW in Europe. In other words, the "flat" trend in August was the result of regional redistribution rather than simultaneous stabilization across all regions.


 

Europe

China exported 6.51 GW of modules to Europe in August, down 5% MoM and 48% YoY. From January to August, China exported 65.44 GW of modules to Europe, down 10% YoY. The Netherlands remains the largest European importer of Chinese modules, sourcing 2.61 GW, followed by Italy (0.61 GW), Belgium (0.45 GW), the UK (0.43 GW), and France (0.42 GW).   

Import volumes across markets continued to show divergent trends: figures rose for Italy (from 0.49 GW to 0.61 GW), Spain (from 0.31 GW to 0.41 GW), and the UK (from 0.27 GW to 0.43 GW, up 60%), declined for Slovenia (from 0.58 GW to 0.42 GW), Greece (0.42 GW to 0.23 GW), and Poland (0.30 GW to 0.21 GW), while remaining at 0.31 GW for Germany.

The increase in the UK can be attributed to specific policy developments. Effective August 27, 2026, the UK officially legalized the self-installation of plug-in (balcony) solar systems. Under regulation SI 2026/848, micro-inverters are capped at an 800 W AC output, while DC-side panel capacity can reach approximately 2,000 W, with energy storage excluded. Given that the regulation was finalized on July 16 and took effect in late August, the rise in imports during August likely reflects pre-launch stocking by distributors, rather than stronger demand in the existing rooftop market.

Overall, European demand did not strengthen in August. According to InfoLink’s price index, European module prices remained stable with a slight downward trend during the month: the average price for BC modules stood at USD 0.131/W at month-end, while TOPCon modules were around USD 0.119/W. Moving forward, key variables include negative electricity prices and grid-integration constraints in markets with high solar penetration, the pace of energy storage deployment, and the implementation timeline of the EU’s local manufacturing and procurement requirements.


 

Asia-Pacific

China exported 4.02 GW of modules to the Asia-Pacific market in August, a 10% MoM recovery and a 59% YoY decline. From January to August, China exported 48.76 GW of modules to the Asia-Pacific, down 15% YoY. Among major markets, Pakistan imported 0.93 GW, up 14% MoM from 0.81 GW, returning to the top spot. Australia ranked second at 0.50 GW, unchanged from July, followed by the Philippines (0.39 GW), Japan (0.38 GW), and Thailand (0.29 GW). Exports to Indonesia rebounded significantly to 0.27 GW from 0.07 GW in July.

The increase in Pakistan has been modest, insufficient to confirm that the inventory destocking phase has ended. Of greater significance is the shift in the structure of demand itself. In February 2026, NEPRA issued the "Prosumer Regulations" (SRO 251(I)/2026), transitioning the settlement mechanism for distributed solar to "net billing." Under the regulations, surplus electricity is repurchased at the national average power purchase price, whereas electricity purchased from the grid remains subject to retail tariff tiers. InfoLink expects this adjustment to shift the focus of the Pakistani market from "system oversizing and arbitrage through surplus electricity sales" to "maximizing self-consumption + energy storage deployment." While average monthly module imports are unlikely to return to the levels seen in 1H26, energy storage and inverters are expected to account for a larger share of system configurations.

The Philippines maintained a steady import volume of 0.39 GW, with a cumulative total of 6.45 GW recorded from January to August, making it the third-largest market in the Asia-Pacific region. The market's resilience this year is directly linked to energy security concerns. Triggered by a fuel crisis resulting from the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the country declared a national energy emergency via Executive Order No. 110 on March 24, which remained in effect until June 30.

In Indonesia, the President announced on August 14 plans to deploy 30 GW of solar power capacity in 2026, with a medium- to long-term target of 100 GW, alongside the phase-out of 13 GW of diesel-fired generation units. This provided a policy backdrop for the simultaneous surge in the country’s module and cell imports in August. 

India's module imports remained at a low level in August, totaling around 0.07 GW, close to the level in July. Chona’s module exports to Southeast Asian markets—Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Malaysia—stood at around 0.29 GW, 0.21 GW, 0.09 GW, and 0.06 GW, respectively, still hovering at low levels following the disruption of export routes to the U.S.


 

The Americas

China exported 2.19 GW of modules to the Americas in August, up 30% MoM, the fastest increase recorded in August among the five regions, despite a 29% YoY decrease. From January to August, China exported 16.56 GW of modules to the Americas, down 15% YoY. Among major markets, Brazil imported 0.92 GW, marking the third consecutive month of growth since June. Following that were Colombia (0.32 GW, its record high in 2026), Mexico (0.23 GW), Panama (0.15 GW), and the U.S.  (0.10 GW). 

Regarding the rebound in Brazil over the past three months, InfoLink maintains that it reflects timing adjustments driven by tax policies and import quotas, rather than a fundamental shift in distributed demand. An import tariff quota for utility-scale projects exceeding 5 MW reduces the tariff from 25% to 9.6%.This measure will be valid until July 2027, creating an incentive for utility-scale projects to bring forward module imports. In the meantime, inverter import duties rose from 12.6% to 20% in 2026, while the cancelation of China’s export tax rebates has also increased landed costs, leaving overall system cost under pressure.

The distributed segment continues to face pressure from the phased increase in TUSD Fio B charges under Law 14.300, as well as grid-connection scheduling constraints. As compensation value decreases every year, the importance of self-consumption rises.


 

The Middle East

China exported 1.63 GW of modules to the Middle East in August, up marginally by 3% MoM but saw a 57% YoY decrease. From January to August, China exported 13.06 GW of modules to the Middle East, a 33% YoY decrease, the largest among the five regions. Major importers include Saudi Arabia (0.59 GW), the UAE (0.24 GW), Israel (0.21 GW), Türkiye (0.11 GW), and Jordan (0.10 GW). Saudi Arabia saw slight decline from 0.65 GW, while the UAE experienced an increase from 0.16 GW to 0.24 GW.

The declines in the Middle East stem primarily from deteriorating shipping and insurance conditions, rather than the disappearance of project demand. Since the effective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz in late February 2026, regional maritime risk premiums have remained elevated. According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service, as of early August, commercial shipping through Hormuz had been disrupted for about five months. Regarding the southern Red Sea, Houthi forces announced a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia on July 20, and traceable vessel traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait fell to a near one-year low between August 3 and August 9. Market impacts include war risk premiums surging to 15–20% of hull value, the withdrawal of some liability insurers from providing coverage in the Persian Gulf, and multiple surcharges, including war risk, emergency conflict, emergency fuel, and peak season. InfoLink expects module imports to the Middle East to continue showing high volatility, with customs declaration timing driven by delivery windows, until risk pricing for shipping routes declines. Therefore, monthly data are less indicative of trends than quarterly averages.


 

Africa

China exported 0.91 GW of modules to Africa in August, down 38% MoM and 47% YoY. Africa remained the only one of the five regions to record cumulative growth, with 14.90 GW exported from China in January–August, up 41% YoY from 10.61 GW. Major importers include South Africa (0.16 GW), Egypt (0.16 GW), Sudan (0.07 GW), Nigeria (0.06 GW), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (0.06 GW).

The decline observed in August was highly concentrated: Nigeria saw a monthly reduction of approximately 0.25 GW, South Africa about 0.22 GW, and Egypt around 0.14 GW, which combined exceeded Africa’s total monthly decline. Given that there were no adverse policy shifts in these countries during August, this downturn likely reflects the pace of port operations and customs clearance, rather than a fundamental change in end-market demand. In August, anchorage waiting times at the Port of Lagos (West Africa) reached 14 to 21 days, and the Port of Durban (South Africa) also experienced congestion. East Africa, on the other hand, benefited from transshipment flows resulting from vessels rerouting around the Red Sea. The medium-to-long-term drivers supporting Africa’s module demand remain unchanged: electrification gaps, off-grid and microgrid projects, backup power needs, and energy cost pressures remain structural drivers.


 

Cell exports

In August 2026, China exported roughly 7.84 GW of cells, up around 54% from the year’s low. The Asia-Pacific market was the largest destination at around 4.35 GW, with its share recovering from 47% in July to 56%. Africa received around 2.07 GW, accounting for roughly 26% of the total, followed by the Middle East at around 0.80 GW, or 10%. Exports to the Americas reached 0.59 GW, while Europe accounted for only around 0.03 GW.

By country, Indonesia surged to the top destination with 2.01 GW of imports from China. It was followed by the Philippines, Nigeria, Kenya, and Türkiye  at around 1.08 GW, 0.75 GW, 0.72 GW, and 0.59 GW, respectively. The U.S. received around 0.59 GW, followed by Laos at 0.57 GW and Uzbekistan at 0.37 GW. Djibouti and Tanzania each received about 0.19 GW.

Three structural shifts in cell exports worth noting  in August.

First, exports to Indonesia, Laos, and the Philippines rose sharply ahead of the Section 232 effective date. Combined exports to the three markets increased by around 2.18 GW MoM in August, accounting for 80% of the overall monthly increase in cell exports. A key feature of the Section 232 framework is that the minimum import price (MIP) applies regardless of country of origin. Cells entering the U.S. after Dec. 4 must meet a minimum price threshold of USD 0.22/W. Given a combined lead time of around two to three months for ocean freight and module assembly, cells shipped in August and September represent the final batches that may still clear U.S. customs before the new requirement takes effect. This helps explain why the August increase was concentrated in markets with module assembly capacity that are not currently subject to anti-dumping and countervailing duties. 

Meanwhile, direct U.S. imports of cells from China reached around 0.59 GW in August and 3.87 GW from January through August. This continued to reflect the capacity gap between U.S. module assembly and domestic cell production following the expiration of the Section 201 safeguard measure on Feb. 7, 2026.

However, this front-loading window has been actively narrowed by administrative measures since late September. On Sept. 22, 2026, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a temporary final rule (Docket No. 260915-0004, RIN 0694-AK57) specifically targeting stockpiling ahead of the Section 232 effective date. The rule is in effect from Sept. 22 through Dec. 3, 2026, covering the entire remaining window before the new requirements take effect.

The rule has three key provisions. First, for importers of record (IORs) registered before August 6, 2026, the Department of Commerce will review each importer’s cumulative and average weekly imports after August 6 against its average weekly imports from January 1 through August 6, 2026, as well as its 2025 weekly average. If imports are found to be significantly above historical levels, Commerce will instruct U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to prohibit further imports by that IOR through December 3. Second, new importers registered with CBP on or after August 6, 2026, face very low weekly import caps: 2,000 cells under HTSUS 8541.42.00, 55 modules under HTSUS 8541.43.00, and 12 kg of polysilicon. The limits effectively close off the use of newly registered IORs to handle front-loaded shipments. 

Third, customs brokers are subject to proactive due diligence requirements. They must verify whether an importer was newly registered on or after August 6, whether its beneficial owners have established multiple IORs, and whether the ultimate consignee is already subject to an import restriction. Brokers that facilitate circumvention may face license revocation or penalties. Restricted companies may apply to BIS for an exemption, with the Department of Commerce stating that it will respond within 14 days of receiving an application.

Notably, BIS stated in the rule that trade data from the week following the issuance of Proclamation 11052 showed sharp increases in imports by some importers relative to their historical weekly averages. BIS therefore invoked the good cause exception under the Administrative Procedure Act, allowing the rule to take immediate effect without prior notice and comment. This administrative record supports InfoLink’s assessment of the August surge in cell exports: the increase was driven by front-loading ahead of the December 4 deadline rather than a recovery in end-market demand. 

Looking ahead, as the restrictions are based on historical import volumes at the U.S. importer level, overseas module manufacturers may still face constraints even if they successfully secure Chinese cells and complete assembly, as their U.S. buyers may not have sufficient allowable import volume available. InfoLink expects shipment volumes to remain partly supported by the delivery of August orders in early September, before slowing noticeably later in the month. When setting quotations and payment terms, suppliers should therefore treat whether U.S. buyers have sufficient allowable import volume before December 4 as a prerequisite for extending credit, rather than focusing solely on assembly-side production schedules.

Second, African trade flows have undergone a round of reshuffling, with the Ethiopia route effectively exiting the market. Ethiopia recorded zero cell imports for a second consecutive month, after importing 0.33 GW in June, leaving cumulative imports in January–August at around 3.23 GW. Kenya and Nigeria, meanwhile, remained steady at 0.72 GW and 0.75 GW, respectively, together accounting for roughly 70% of Africa’s cell imports. Djibouti also rebounded to around 0.19 GW after recording no imports in July. On July 17, 2026, the U.S. Department of Commerce initiated a countrywide anti-circumvention inquiry into Ethiopia, with a preliminary determination expected on Dec. 10, 2026 and a final determination around May 10, 2027. Any resulting measures could apply retroactively to the initiation date. Unlike in July, the latest trade data provide sufficient evidence that the Ethiopia route has not merely paused but effectively closed. At the same time, as Kenya and Nigeria absorb more shipment volumes, their exposure to potential future anti-circumvention investigations is also increasing. Djibouti’s rebound warrants additional attention given its role as Ethiopia’s main maritime gateway and a key node along Red Sea shipping routes.

Third, the India route has effectively closed, while Uzbekistan and Türkiye are emerging as new hubs. India imported only around 0.04 GW of cells from China in August, down more than 98% from 2.56 GW in April. Cumulative imports reached 9.63 GW from January through August, with nearly all shipments concentrated in the first half of the year. India’s ALMM List-II became mandatory on June 1, 2026 for government-supported, net-metering, and Open Access projects. On Aug. 21, the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) issued the ninth revision of List-II, bringing listed domestic cell capacity to around 39.4 GW, compared with 217 GW of module capacity under List-I. ALMM-compliant cell supply remains a bottleneck for India’s domestic market, but expanding local capacity is gradually filling the gap, leaving little room for direct cell exports from China to India.

By contrast, China’s cell exports to Türkiye reached around 0.59 GW in August, the highest level this year, bringing January–August shipments to 3.06 GW. Exports to Uzbekistan reached around 0.37 GW, marking the fifth consecutive month of growth. The two markets are emerging as new assembly and transshipment hubs.
 

Policy and market developments in August

Overall, China’s PV export market showed three key trends in August 2026.

First, monthly module exports stabilized, while the cumulative YoY decline widened to around 12%. The 50% YoY drop in August was amplified by the exceptionally high base of 30.82 GW in the same month last year, the highest monthly level of 2025. Even excluding the base effect from India alone, however, the decline remained above 40%, indicating that price renegotiations and distribution-channel adjustments following the cancellation of China’s export tax rebates have yet to run their course. Still, flat MoM shipments suggest that export volumes have found short-term support at around 15 GW.

Second, regional shifts, rather than a broad-based recovery, are driving the market. Gains in the Americas and Asia-Pacific were offset by declines in Africa and Europe. The Middle East recorded the steepest cumulative YoY decline at around 33%, driven not by weaker project demand but largely by higher shipping risk premiums associated with the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. Africa was the only region to post cumulative growth, at around 41%, although the source of that growth has shifted from modules to cells. Over the coming months, the focus should therefore be on how shipment volumes are shifting across regions, rather than on the overall level of exports.

Third, the driver of cell exports has shifted from reactive rerouting to deliberate front-loading. The regional reshuffling seen in June and July was largely a defensive response to the pace of U.S. trade investigations. By August, however, suppliers were actively accelerating shipments to take advantage of the window before the December 4 deadline. This has two implications for order assessment. First, the front-loading has a hard deadline. Deliveries may continue to support shipments in September, but volumes are likely to come under pressure from October, earlier than the previously expected November slowdown. Second, shipment volumes and prices are moving on different timelines. Volumes rose first, while prices responded later. In early September, InfoLink observed earlier elevated cell quotations in China and Southeast Asia retreating sharply, with premiums narrowing substantially. This does not contradict the surge shown in August customs data. Rather, it is a natural consequence of front-loaded inventory building having largely run its course.

For Chinese cell and module manufacturers, attention should now turn to inventories accumulated across distribution channels in September and October, which could create another round of destocking pressure in the first quarter of 2027 once front-loading ends. Meanwhile, emerging hubs such as Kenya, Nigeria, Uzbekistan, and Türkiye may have effective operating windows of only 12 to 18 months under the current pace of U.S. trade investigations. As a result, the customer mix is likely to shift faster than the underlying price cycle.